

Town Meeting



BULLETIN OF AMERICA'S TOWN MEETING OF THE AIR

BROADCAST BY STATIONS OF THE AMERICAN BROADCASTING CO.



How Can Germany Be United?

Acting Moderator, GREGOR ZIEMER

Speakers

H. V. KALTENBORN
WAVERLY ROOT

RAYMOND DANIELL
MAX LERNER

(See also page 12)

COMING

—August 8, 1946—

Is the Veteran Getting a Square Deal in
Education?

—August 15, 1946—

“How Can Peace Be Brought to Palestine?”

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THE BROADCAST OF AUGUST 8:

"Is the Veteran Getting a Square Deal in Education?"



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BULLETIN OF AMERICA'S TOWN MEETING OF THE AIR

GEORGE V. DENNY, JR., MODERATOR



AUGUST 1, 1946

VOL. 12, No. 14

How Can Germany Be United?

Announcer:

Good evening, friends. Welcome to the four hundred and thirty-third broadcast of America's Town Meeting of the Air, coming to you tonight from the American Broadcasting Company's studios in Radio City, New York. Our subject is one of grave concern to the American people—"How Can Germany Be United?" In the absence of Mr. George V. Denny, Jr., founder and moderator of America's Town Meeting, the guest moderator will be Mr. Gregor Ziemer, educational director of Town Hall and noted writer and lecturer. Mr. Ziemer. (*Applause.*)

Moderator Ziemer:

Good evening, fellow Americans. Less than 500 days ago millions of American boys from your hometown and mine had only one driving impulse: to split Germany into as many disunited segments as possible. When I had the privilege of spearheading with

Combat Command B of General Patton's Fourth Armored Division, we sliced through Germany hither and yon, while north and south of us other units did the same until our colonel's briefing map looked like a display of shoestring potatoes.

Yes, we succeeded well in disuniting Germany, but so fast has history galloped, so much has happened in a little more than a year that tonight we can afford to worry about uniting Germany for the sake of all of us.

We have all reason to worry and no reason for congratulations, not now, August, 1946. We all know that until the fate of Germany is determined, the fate of Europe is unknown, and, as long as the fate of Europe is unknown, our fate and the fate of our children is not determined.

I remember speaking with an aged woman, Mother Elsa Kobach, in a little German village the morning after we rolled through

the dread concentration camp of Buchenwald.

"What will become of us Germans now?" she asked.

My answer was, "That depends entirely upon you Germans."

I see now how wrong I was. Now the world knows that it depends on the Germans *and* on us. So tonight, on the anniversary of the signing of the Potsdam Agreement by President Truman, Prime Minister Attlee, and Generalissimo Stalin, we ask ourselves, "How Can Germany Be United?"

The very fact that we don't as yet have a clear-cut solution of that question makes us shudder with foreboding. Are there to be two Germanys—an East Germany under the hammer and sickle of Russia and a West Germany where American, British, and French authorities co-exist in a shotgun alliance? Or are we to abide by the provisions of the Potsdam Agreement which insists on the administration of Germany as an economic unit by the four powers?

We charge our speakers with grave responsibilities tonight and are eager to have answers to the questions we have raised. So we look to Mr. H. V. Kaltenborn, dean of American radio news commentators; Raymond Daniell, foreign correspondent for the *New York Times*; Max Lerner, author, radio commentator, chief editorial writer of *PM*; and Waverly Root, veteran correspondent and author,

to provide us with these answers. We'll first hear from Mr. H. V. Kaltenborn. (*Applause.*)

Mr. Kaltenborn:

How Can Germany Be United? The very form of our question assumes that Germany can be and should be united. The issue we confront is how this unity can be achieved. The aims of the Big Three Potsdam Agreement of July, 1945, was "To prepare for the eventual reconstruction of German political life on a democratic basis and for eventual peaceful cooperation in international life by Germany."

Thus, the men of Potsdam believed it would be possible to re-create a peaceful politically and economically united Germany. But the means adopted to carry out the Potsdam Agreement were not suited to achieve this purpose.

They included: (1) drastic de-industrialization; (2) territorial truncation; (3) mass transfers of population; and (4) a divided Germany.

One year has passed since Potsdam. We know now that the means so far employed will not achieve German reconstruction. The British and American authorities have already agreed that the division of Germany into watertight economic departments is hopelessly impractical. It prevents the Germans from reconstructing their economic life. It costs the British and American taxpayers

alone nearly \$500,000,000 a year to provide the 30 million Germans in the two zones with a minimum of food and supervision.

German industry remains crippled for lack of fuel, raw materials, and markets. They could make beautiful dolls in American-occupied Bavaria if they could only get glass eyes for the dolls from Russian-occupied Thuringia. This is one of a thousand examples.

That is why everyone agrees there must be a larger measure of economic unity. The British and American zones have decided to treat their part of Germany as an economic unit. This is the first practical step towards essential unity. When the economic barriers between all four occupation zones have been broken down, we will be on the way toward an integrated Germany which means an integrated Europe.

There can be no sound European economy without a sound German economy. Economic and political peace in Europe depends on economic and political peace in Germany. We can never convince the German people that war does not pay unless we also convince them that peace does pay. *(Applause.)*

We would not be asking tonight "How Can Germany Be United?" if we felt that a united Germany must be a threat to peace. Germany can be both united and

peaceful if (1) Germany's armament industry is destroyed and outlawed; (2) Germany's peaceful industries are encouraged; (3) German democracy is popularized; and (4) German occupation continues long enough to assure the achievement of these aims.

The prohibition against German armament need not mean restriction of industrial development. The stripping of German industries must stop. To make Germany an economic slum in the heart of Europe is no solution of the German problem. The more we impoverish Germany, the more we must use our wealth and our own manpower to continue controls. Population experts already predict a 50 per cent decline in Germany's population within half a century.

How could Germany be unified politically? Integrating the four occupation zones is again the first essential. To divide Germany forcibly into the separate states which were unified by Bismarck would be a futile attempt to turn back the clock of history.

We can't bully Germans into loving democracy. The Germans must work out their own political destiny. Having lost out with militarism and dictatorship, they may now try democracy. If the people of such once-independent areas as Bavaria, Saxony, the Rhineland, want a large measure

of local autonomy, they should have it.

Dire necessity and common sense demand German economic unity. Political unity will inevitably grow out of economic unity, but we should not, and cannot, re-impose that separation of little German states which was the curse of Europe for centuries. Nor can we expect any one nation, or even the United Nations, to police and dominate a reconstructed Germany.

Only the German people can create a new German spirit. To some extent, we can lead them. To a larger extent, we can help them. But we must not deceive ourselves into the belief that we can or will continue to use force for more than one generation to compel 70 million Germans to do our bidding. (*Applause.*)

Moderator Ziemer:

Thank you, Mr. Kaltenborn, for your clear analysis of the over-all problem. Now, for another point of view, we turn to Mr. Raymond Daniell, foreign correspondent for the *New York Times*, who has just now returned from Germany. Mr. Daniell. (*Applause.*)

Mr. Daniell:

I happen to disagree with Mr. Kaltenborn's thesis that a reduction in the power of pressure would be a sufficient guarantee of future freedom from German aggression. However, the immediate problem is not the form of the

future government of Germany. It is how now, under the occupation, to integrate the economy of a shattered country so that the cost of conquest won't tempt British and American taxpayers to give Germany back to the Germans too soon.

Great Britain, the United States, and the Soviet Union agreed at Potsdam, about a year ago, to administer conquered Germany as a single economic unit. There's no reason to suppose that they did not intend to do so. However, upon the insistence of the western powers, a fourth party, France, which had not participated in the Potsdam Conference, was invited to share in the occupation and administration of Germany.

From that time forth, every effort by Britain, the Soviet Union, and the United States to bring about centralized control of trade and economics was blocked by France. The French had not been represented at the conference which amputated a large chunk of Eastern Germany, and fearing the recrudescence of a strong, united Germany, refused to take any action which might bring about a revival of German power until their own demand for separation of the Rhineland and the Ruhr had been settled.

I believe Mr. Root is going to discuss the justification for the French claims, but it seems to me we're not so much concerned with

the merits of the French claim, as with the effect of the delay in carrying out the pledges of Potsdam.

When it became apparent that insurmountable obstacles lay in the way of unified administration, the Soviets on the one hand and the western powers on the other perforce went about the business of administering their own zones in their own way.

It's not surprising, although it's nonetheless tragic, that the conquerors sought in their own zones to create a Germany after their own image. The result has been economic stagnation and a sharp cleavage of ideologies.

Whatever there was left of liberalism in Germany is being crushed out between the eastern and the western concepts of democracy. Two distinctly different Germanys are emerging on opposite sides of the Elbe, one facing East and the other facing West. It is impossible to bring them together again without the consent and the support of the Soviet Union. Since that is so, it seems essential that we consider first why Russia holds back, and, second, what is the prerequisite for her cooperation in the administration of Germany.

In the deadlock which exists in Germany, the Soviets are in a far better position than their former western allies to play a waiting game. Without the free flow of

domestic commerce within Germany, both the British and American zones are liabilities. Only the Russian zone, the surplus food producing area, is even approximately self-supporting, and in the struggle for control of all of Germany, Russia has certain obvious advantages.

The problem of Germany is a world problem. It must be seen as such if the peace and prosperity for which so many suffered and died is to become a reality. Between the Potsdam Conference and the present, much has happened to aggravate the relations between the western and eastern partners in the grand alliance which crushed Germany and Japan.

The plain truth is that Russia fears not a revival of a German aggressor state, but a Germany which will be a tool for western aggression just as many persons in the United States and Great Britain fear the expansionist tendencies of Communist Russia.

There's a kind of psychopathic suspicion underlying all the Soviet thinking and foreign policy. How is it to be allayed?

Certainly not by appeasement. History has shown the folly of such a course. But suppose we could convince the Soviets that we never, under any circumstances, in Europe or in Asia, would attack them or the countries now under their protection.

In my opinion, the straightforward treaty of nonaggression and mutual assistance in the case of an attack upon Russia, from any quarter, would go a long way toward convincing the leaders of that country that they can cooperate with us without fear in peace as in war. If that could be done, it would remove the most serious barrier to our unified administration of the country we conquered together, and, in my opinion, it would go far toward removing the very real danger of a new world war. (*Applause.*)

Moderator Ziemer:

Thank you, Mr. Daniell. Now, let's hear Mr. Waverly Root give us his answer to the question of "How Can Germany Be United?" Mr. Root is a professional foreign correspondent and author of the current book, *The Secret History of the War*. Mr. Root. (*Applause.*)

Mr. Root:

Within the short space of 80 years, Germany has launched five unprovoked aggressive wars against her neighbors. This historical record justifies the other nations of the world in seeking to make sure that Germany shall not undertake a sixth aggression. It is not the spirit of revenge which dictates that policy. It is simple caution.

Chief victim of Germany's last three aggressions has been France. That is why France insists that

the first consideration of the treatment of Germany must be her inescapable disarmament. Three generations of Frenchmen have been sacrificed to German ambition. France can't afford to lose a fourth. She is fighting for a national existence when she demands that the victors make sure that this time the war they have won shall stay won.

Security is the whole keynote of French policy. In the French view, unity for Germany is a secondary question. Before she consents to unity, she wants the term "Germany" defined.

Does it mean prewar Germany?

Does it mean prewar Germany minus what has already been lopped off in the east?

Or, does it mean Germany less Silesia in the east, and minus the Ruhr, the Rhineland, and the Saar in the west?

France believes that with the Ruhr, Germany possesses the potential power to make war; without it she does not. That is why she wants political control of the Ruhr removed from German hands. She will not necessarily insist that Germany should lose the economic fruits of the industry of the Ruhr. The Frenchmen might agree with Mr. Kaltenborn that Germany should not become a European slum; but they insist that she must not remain a European Essen.

The trouble with most of the

plans put forward for the Ruhr so far in opposition to France's own scheme for its internationalization is that they do not put it out of Germany's power to change the status of the Ruhr at some later date by her own unilateral action. An allied control commission over a German-governed Ruhr does not satisfy France's demand for indisputable security. Some day that commission will dissolve, and Germany will remain in possession of the Ruhr.

Nor will the French be satisfied with German engagements, however solemn, to restrict Ruhr industry to the production of the goods of peace. They have no faith in German promises. A German government accepted the demilitarization of the Rhineland after the last war, but another German government violated the treaty and rearmed the safety zone. France does not intend to leave it within Germany's possibilities this time to change her mind and break her word.

Once again, as after the last war, France is asking control of the left bank of the Rhine, making that river her boundary. She abandoned her earlier claim at the insistence of other Allies who offered her the demilitarization of the Rhineland and the Locarno Treaty as a substitute guarantee of security. The substitute guarantee didn't work.

France allowed herself to be

talked out of her demand last time and suffered a disastrous military defeat in consequence. It is not going to be easy to talk her out of it again.

France's interest in the Saar is based less on security—although that does enter into it to some extent—than on economic reasons. The coal of the Saar is a natural complement to the iron ore of Alsace-Lorraine. France's own coal mines were badly dilapidated during the German occupation. She feels it only just that she should be compensated for her loss by acquiring the coal of the Saar.

In its essentials, France will not compromise on her demand for security, guaranteed this time by something more tangible than promises, whether those promises come from her ex-enemy, or from her ex-Allies.

No French government can possibly agree to any such compromise for it would be overthrown immediately if it did so. Following Molotov's recent statement on the unification of Germany, every newspaper in France, from extreme right to extreme left joined in upholding the French program and criticizing the Molotov statement. This included the French Communists.

The official Communist newspaper, *L'Humanité* wrote that "for some time the French Communist party had had differences of opinion with the German Commun-

ists. Is it not natural that in international debates, the views of France and the Soviet Union may differ, indeed conflict? The French Communists intend to fight to assure that the security of our nation is safeguarded."

It is easy for us on this far side of the Atlantic to criticize the French for demanding iron-clad guarantees of security, but if we had Germany for a next-door neighbor, if we had been invaded by her three times in 70 years, we would want to be safe, too.

In any case, we must take heed of French desires for a very simple reason: After we have gone home, France will still be there—next door to Germany. She will be in a position to enforce her policy. We shall not. (*Applause.*)

Moderator Ziemer:

Thank you, Mr. Root. Our final statement on the problem of the unification of Germany will come from Mr. Max Lerner, radio commentator and chief editorial writer for *PAM*. Mr. Lerner. (*Applause.*)

Mr. Lerner:

We won the war against Germany by a coalition of the Big Three. We are losing the peace to Germany because the coalition is breaking up. We have no plan except a vague one for a federalized Germany which solves nothing. We have no philosophy except fear of Russia, which plays

into the hands of the old gang in Germany.

The beginning of wisdom is to ask, "Who will control the German economy?"

In the rivalry between Britain and Russia for the mastery of Europe, the German economy holds the balance of power. In the wrong hands it can hurl the world into another war and send Germany itself back to the dark ages.

I don't want to see either the Russians or the British get control of the German economy. Either of them might force a war to prevent the other from getting firmly entrenched in Germany. The Russians are already getting what they can out of east Germany; the British are moving to make the Ruhr part of their own sphere of influence.

What decent democratic person can look at the whole foreign policy of either Russia or Britain now and say that either of them can be trusted with such a huge additional power as the German economy would add to them. (*Applause.*)

Well, some people are asking "How about giving Germany back to the Germans?" I say, "To what Germans?" Suppose you unify Germany now and pull out. Then suppose the Communists win out in the struggle for power in Germany. That means that Russia gets the German economic machine and the war machine that can be

built on it. Or suppose the Centrist church parties win out. That means that Britain gets the German economic machine and the war machine that can be built on it.

Actually, however, giving Germany back to the Germans, whether under a loose federation or a strong government, will mean that the Nazis will win out. Only a handful of real German democrats have survived. It would take them 25 years to get some strength, if then. The Nazis are waiting. They won't come back as Nazis. Oh, no! But they'll rebuild the cartels; they'll promise to help us against Russia and the Communists, and again, as two decades ago, we'll have voices in our own country clamoring to support them.

I say, is there no way out at all? I think there is if we'll use it.

Suppose we go at it by asking what are the essentials that any plan for Germany must aim at.

(1) It must have continuous military policing of the German people for at least 25 years. Unless Germany is effectively policed, the Nazi terror is bound to come back. (Applause.)

(2) Germany needs outside control of its economy. Otherwise the cartels will come back.

(3) Germany needs efficient and unified operation of its economy. That economy must be run for the benefit of Europe as well as for the benefit of the German people.

(4) The Germans need at least 25 years of re-education in political and economic democracy and sheer human decency. (Applause.)

Now, these four needs point in only one direction, and that's the plan of making Germany a United Nations baby by putting it under a technical United Nations commission to run. Right now the Big Four are working at crazy cross-purposes because each of them is desperately anxious to beat the others out in winning over the German people. Only one agency can undercut this competition—the United Nations acting as a whole.

We have the precedents—we're just internationalizing Trieste, which is a minor sore compared to the major running sore of Germany.

We have the beginnings of the plan in Germany. The French have long been demanding, as Mr. Root has told us, that the Ruhr and the Rhineland be cut off and internationalized. All right, let's do that, but you can't deal with the German problem piecemeal any more than you can deal with a cancer piecemeal.

If you internationalize the Rhineland, the Saar, and the Ruhr, why not all of Germany? We have the method. We have the Baruch plan for the atom bomb to internationalize the atom bomb at the source by having the UN take it over.

THE SPEAKERS' COLUMN

GREGOR ZIEMER—A well-known radio commentator, author, and educator, Dr. Ziemer was born in Columbia, Michigan, in 1899. He received a B.A. degree from the University of Illinois; an M.A. degree from the University of Minnesota; and a Ph.D. from the University of Berlin.

In the educational field, Dr. Ziemer was head of the journalism department of Park Region Junior College, supervisor of schools in the Philippine Islands from 1926 to 1928, and founder of the American Colony in Berlin in 1928. Dr. Ziemer was also Berlin correspondent for the *New York Herald*, the *London Daily Mail*, and the *Chicago Tribune*. After the Berlin school was closed, he lectured widely in the United States and was a radio newscaster for station WLW.

In June, 1944, Dr. Ziemer went overseas with the Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces. He served as a lieutenant colonel in the Fourth Armored Division of the Third Army. He also helped to organize the newspapers in Germany.

Dr. Ziemer is the author of *Two Thousand and Ten Days of Hitler* (with his daughter Patsy), and *Education for Death*. The latter book was also the basis for the motion picture *Hitler's Children*.

Dr. Ziemer is Educational Director at Town Hall.

HANS V. KALTENBORN—Dean of radio commentators, H. V. Kaltenborn made his first news broadcast in 1922. Since then, his voice, clipped and clear, has become one of the best known on the air. Born in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, Mr. Kaltenborn was graduated from Harvard in 1909 with an A.B. cum laude. Since then, he has received several honorary degrees. For twenty years, 1910-1930, he was associated with the *Brooklyn Eagle*. In 1930, he left the *Eagle* for WABC, key station for the Columbia network. Since 1940, he has been with the National Broadcasting Company. Mr. Kaltenborn has been radio reporter for many political conventions, national and international congresses, League of Nations sessions, Pan American Peace Conferences, and the like. Mr. Kaltenborn is the author of several books and many magazine articles. Among his books are *We Look at the World*, *Kaltenborn Edits the News*, and *I Broadcast the Crisis*. Mr. Kaltenborn is widely traveled and has a knowledge of several foreign languages, including French, German, and Italian.

WAVERLEY ROOT—A syndicated newspaper columnist and radio commentator, Mr. Root is an authority on France and is frequently consulted in an advisory capacity by official organizations concerned with French affairs. Of the

13 years he spent as a foreign correspondent, 11 were spent in France. He has represented the *Chicago Tribune*, the United Press, *Time*, and the Mutual Broadcasting System in Europe. He was also the Paris correspondent for one of Europe's leading newspapers, the *Politiken* of Copenhagen, from 1932 until Hitler invaded Denmark in 1940.

Mr. Root became French correspondent for the Mutual Broadcasting System at the time of the Munich crisis.

Returning to this country in July, 1940, Mr. Root now writes a daily column, "Backstage of the War," which appears in leading papers in the United States, South America, and Canada. He is also news analyst for Station WAAT, New York. Mr. Root is a champion of the De Gaulle movement and devoted much space to this subject in his *Secret History of the War*.

FRANCIS RAYMOND DANIELL—Born in New Haven, Connecticut, in 1901, Raymond Daniell had his college training at Rutgers University. In 1923, he became a newspaper reporter on the *New York Herald*. Later he was on the staff of Associated Press and the *New York Post*. Since 1929, he has been on the staff of the *New York Times*. From 1939 to 1945, he was chief London correspondent and director of *New York Times, Ltd.*, of London. Mr. Daniell, who recently returned from Germany, is the author of *Civilians Must Fight*.

MAX LERNER—Dr. Lerner has been chief editorial writer for PM since 1943. He was born in Minsk, Russia, in 1902, and was brought to the United States at the age of five. He received his A.B. degree from Yale and then studied law there for a year. He has an A.M. degree from Washington University and a Ph.D. from Robert Brookings Graduate School of Economics and Government.

In 1927, Dr. Lerner was assistant editor of the *Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences* and later became managing editor. From 1932 to 1936, he was a member of the social science faculty at Sarah Lawrence College. During two of those years, he was chairman of the faculty of Wellesley Summer Institute. In 1935, he became a lecturer in the department of government at Harvard and for two years, 1936 to 1938, Dr. Lerner was editor of *The Nation*.

From 1938 to 1943, he was professor of political science at Williams College. In addition to his writings for PM magazines, Dr. Lerner is the author of several books including *Public Journal*, *The Mind and Faith of Justice Holmes*, *Ideas for the Ice Age*, *Ideas Are Weapons*, and *It Is Later Than You Think*.

Well, the German problem is a kind of political atom bomb. Why not have a similar plan for internationalizing the German problem at the source? We have the instrument. Down South the TVA is run by a government corporation and run well. The Baruch Plan wants an international government corporation—an atomic development authority.

I say, why not have a German-control authority, an international government corporation under a UN commission to run Germany. It would be run as a unit, but not by Germans. (*Applause.*)

I don't say this is a cinch. I don't say it's perfect. I do say it's the only thing that has a decent chance of working. It would be a real step toward strengthening the United Nations; it would be a real step toward world government.

Let me add: Let's take the German problem out of the sphere of power politics. Let's put it into the hands of the nations of the world. (*Applause.*)

Moderator Ziemer:

Thank you, Mr. Lerner. Well, you four gentlemen have certainly given us a variety of answers to the basic issues of the German problem. Now at this time, as usual, before we take questions from the audience, let's see how good you gentlemen are at tossing fast, barbed questions at each other, just so you toss them over the

plate because I'm supposed to be the umpire. Now, Mr. Kaltenborn, would you like to get in the pitcher's box first?

Mr. Kaltenborn: Well, yes, I would because I think there is something of a challenge in Max Lerner's final sentence. I am surprised that so realistic an individual as he would conclude with the sentence, "Let's take it out of power politics and put it in the hands of the nations of the world." Well, where is power politics if not in the hands of the nations of the world? (*Applause.*)

He says we've got an example in Trieste. Not yet, Mr. Lerner. We may have it in five or ten years, but only today both Italy rejected that solution and Yugoslavia rejected it, so they'll both sabotage it and how the United Nations is going to handle it, I don't know. Let's see, but don't cite it as an example that's going to prove that 70 million Germans can be handled by a board, with or without the veto power, by the way. Well, tell us a little more how the United Nations is going to solve the problem.

Mr. Ziemer: There is one with a curve, Mr. Lerner. Did you catch it?

Mr. Lerner: Oh, I caught it all right. I caught its indirection as well as its direction. (*Applause.*) Mr. Kaltenborn asks where power politics is if not in the hands of the nations of the world.

I think power politics is in the hands of the big powers. That's what I'm talking about. It's in the hands of Russia and Britain and America and France. What I am arguing is to take it out of the area where they have a whole bunch of bones to be going after, to be snarling at, and put it into a United Nations Security Council and Assembly where they can do all their arguing beforehand, but once the United Nations has made up its mind and given instructions to a commission as to how to run Germany, then that's settled and the commission runs it.

Now, Mr. Kaltenborn also says Trieste hasn't solved anything yet. Of course not, Mr. Kaltenborn. All of us are still, in this crazy, tortured world of ours, at the beginning of things, not at the end. I am simply saying that if we have the world will to internationalize Trieste, then we ought to have the world will to internationalize a much more dangerous problem than Trieste, which is Germany. I don't say it is sure to give us success. I say it is really worth trying. (*Applause.*)

Mr. Ziemer: Well, you caught that one, Max. Mr. Daniell wants to come in.

Mr. Daniell: I wanted to ask Mr. Lerner one more. We have in Germany now a four-power commission operating under the Potsdam Agreement to administer

Germany as a whole. My question is what leads him to think that 37 of 41 representatives would be any more successful in reaching an agreement than the four who now set and hold the responsibility?

Mr. Lerner: I think that's a very good question, too, and I'd like to answer it this way. The present four-power commission that's trying to run Germany is not trying to run it as a group of disinterested technicians. Everyone of those fellows is representing his country and the power-political interests of his country. (*Applause.*)

That's why I use the example of the TVA and the governmental corporation for my instance.

I am suggesting that you get something like the TVA which is run by a group of disinterested technicians. Choose not Russians, Americans, British, French. Choose people who have the capacity to run the various parts of the economy and the administration no matter what nation they come from. Choose them because they're real individuals with a passion to solve problems. Give them power. Give them instructions and give them power, and you're not going to have the kind of wrangling which you have now, which is the result of each country trying to get control of Germany.

Mr. Kaltenborn: Sounds a lit-

tle like an international cartel to me.

Mr. Lerner: No, it sounds like an international TVA, Mr. Kaltenborn, which is very different from an international cartel. (*Applause.*) The TVA was intended to get rid of the cartels.

Mr. Ziemer: Let's get everybody in on this. How about you, Waverly?

Mr. Root: It seems a shame to gang up on Max Lerner this way, but it's his own fault. He's the only one who's suggested any constructive plan. We were more cautious. (*Laughter and applause.*)

Mr. Lerner: I'll come back at you for that one.

Mr. Root: All right. I hate to be less optimistic than Mr. Lerner. I'd like to believe that the United Nations would be able to handle the problem of Germany, but do you really think that it can be done unless we get some sort of a police force in the United Nations as we have not now? And, if instead of having United Nations handle Germany's problems, we find something like Mr. Byrne's suggestion of a 25-year occupation by the four powers, do you really believe that the United States will keep soldiers in Germany for 25 years without saying, "Get the boys home"?

Mr. Ziemer: That's in the form of a question, isn't it. Max, how about it?

Mr. Lerner: Well, first of all,

Mr. Root has called me an optimist, which is a sort of cuss word these days. Let me say that I'm not. I think I know what's going to happen, but it's not the way out. I think I know the way out, but I don't think it's going to happen. So much for my being an optimist.

Mr. Root asked whether we won't need an international police force. We will. I don't see how we're going to get anything done in this world until we can have a UN police force and genuine control of the military forces of the world.

Mr. Root, I agree with you completely that there is still a lot to be done with the UN and with the American mind on the question of policing before we can really resolve this problem, but I am saying that the German problem is the test of the world will today, and unless we can show a world will, we cannot resolve the German problem. I add, the place to show the world will is within the UN. The world's future stands or falls with the UN and that's why I want the UN tested on this crucial question. (*Applause.*)

Mr. Ziemer: Mr. Root, do you have anything to add? Or Mr. Kaltenborn?

Mr. Kaltenborn: I'd like to say this—that you're putting a very tough job up to the UN in its initial period of life. You'll find that the United Nations will grow

if we support it over a period of time, but you can't expect the United Nations to solve Europe's most dominate problem in which every power, great power, has a vital interest. You can't expect by merely turning it over to the UN to get a solution.

But I'd like to just raise this question. I do think there is a constructive solution outside of the one Mr. Lerner proposed. I do think that when I suggested that disarmament, policing for a certain length of time, education in democracy, economic unity, and then leading the German people and helping them to realize their possibilities is much more constructive than trying to reform from the outside.

I do not believe that any combination of force can transform a nation. I think a nation must purify itself. That's what the German people must do, and let's ask Mr. Daniell whether he doesn't think—he's been there more recently than any of us—that there is a possibility that under right conditions Germany can work her problems out from within? (*Applause.*)

Mr. Daniell: I don't like to disagree with Mr. Kaltenborn too frequently, but having just returned from Germany I can only say in reply to his last question—I've been there nearly a year and a half—that I haven't seen the right conditions brought about for

the reform of Germany yet. I've seen very little attempt at re-education, very little sign of German recognition of her crimes, very little sign of any serious will to deindustrialize, demilitarize, and strip them of their outside wealth.

There's one more thing I'd like to say about Max's thesis, and that is this: The power of any representative on a council to govern Germany stems from the countries that form the United Nations. It seems to me that if the nations themselves are divided by suspicion and fear, there's very little more chance of their agreeing than there is of a four-power council so divided now. That's why I suggest that the fears of Russia be allayed by a treaty of nonaggression. It seems to me that's the core of the whole problem.

Mr. Ziemer: Mr. Lerner, your thesis has been attacked again.

Mr. Lerner: I'd like to address myself only to one remark of Mr. Kaltenborn's which struck me quite hard. It happened, also, to be the last sentence of his talk. He said you can't use force to keep down 70 million people. I say is there anything except force that you can use with a criminal until he has reformed? And I say that what goes for one criminal, goes 70 million times for 70 million Germans. (*Applause.*)

I think it's wishful of us to say that ultimately we are going to

have a German democracy and that the German people will work it out for themselves. I'd like to know whether Mr. Kaltenborn really thinks that at the present time, if we were to leave Germany alone, whether the democratic forces would win out. They're not winning out in German universities. They're not winning out anywhere in Germany where we are allowing the Germans to have their own way. I think we ought to be realistic on that.

Mr. Ziemer: There's a question, Mr. Kaltenborn.

Mr. Kaltenborn: Yes, well, I quite agree. But I'm not talking about today or tomorrow. I'm not talking about Germany under the

conditions that have prevailed during the past year. I'm talking about the possibility for a Germany two decades, three decades from now. After all, the program that I outlined indicated that much time must elapse before you can build up those constructive forces in Germany that can take over the country, but I also disagree that you can indict an entire people of 70 million with one phrase, as Max Lerner so easily does. (*Applause.*)

Mr. Ziemer: Thank you, gentlemen, for that lively flurry. The home runs were too fast for me to count. Let's catch our breath while we pause briefly for station identification.

QUESTIONS, PLEASE!

Mr. Ziemer: As we begin our question period, let me remind you, if you require a reminder, ladies and gentlemen, that one of you will be presented with a \$25 war bond tonight. As you may remember, it goes to the person asking the question which, in the opinion of our committee of judges, seems best for bringing out facts and clarifying this discussion, provided the question is limited to 25 words.

Well, the audience seems ready for the question period. I see a number over on the left—Num-

ber One, intended for Mr. Kaltenborn. Yes?

Man: Mr. Kaltenborn, if you say we cannot condemn 70,000,000 Germans because some of them are no good, why did Hitler condemn the whole Jewish people because some of these people were no good?

Mr. Kaltenborn: Because Hitler, himself, was no good. (*Applause.*)

Mr. Ziemer: Yes, the gentleman in the fifth row. Would you stand, please?

Man: Mr. Daniell, assuming that by means of a nonaggression

fact with the Soviet Union we could convince Russia of our infinite good will, would you then trust the German people to determine their own form of economic structure?

Mr. Daniell: Certainly not now. Perhaps after the three decades that Mr. Kaltenborn talked about. *(Laughter.)*

Mr. Ziemer: Thank you. There's one in the first row right here. Yes, please.

Man: Did you not think that Germany can start and be successful, as the United States was, by forming four states as a start for a republic?

Mr. Kaltenborn: That question was addressed to me. The radio audience doesn't know it, because it was a Number One card. Why, yes, I should think that Germany's old four kingdoms—Saxony, Bavaria, Wurttemberg, and Prussia—could start in as four separate states, create economic unity, give them a large measure of local autonomy, start the concentration of political unity slowly. I should think that they could very easily work out into a republic. As a matter of fact, I'm convinced that that is exactly what would happen.

Man: My question is addressed to Mr. Lerner. Whether or not the UN solves this problem or the four powers attempt it, why shouldn't we first determine what economic structure the people of Germany are able or willing to

maintain before we decide how to unify the country?

Mr. Lerner: To me the question of what kind of economic structure the people of Germany are willing to maintain seems less important than a lot of other things. The really important thing is what kind of economic structure will best benefit the whole of Europe, as well as the living standards of the German people. I'm sure of one thing, and that is it ought not to be monopolistic—it ought not to be a cartel structure. I think that it ought to be government operation of the economy in the most efficient way possible under disinterested people who are not Germans, and if the German people don't like that—at least for the next 25 or 30 years—it is just too bad. *(Applause.)*

Man: Mr. Daniell, did you see anything in the German universities to indicate that the German professors are Nazi professors being transplanted, or do they still distribute their toxin to the Nazi students there?

Mr. Ziemer: That's an educational question, Mr. Daniell.

Mr. Daniell: In the University of Munich, the faculty has been denazified to the satisfaction of the American authorities. However, the large percentage of the faculty now teaching in the University of Munich are the same people who were teaching under the Nazis. They are the militarists, the Junkers,

and, in one instance, a professor who taught racism in the chair established in 1935, under Hitler, is still a member of the faculty, although not teaching that course. The student body has organized into a Student Union, which holds meetings and discusses what it will do with the collaborators—meaning the German collaborators—when the Americans or the AMG's get out. That's true at the University of Tübingen. It's true in Erlangen and it's generally true in the universities where the former officers have precedence in admission.

Mr. Ziemer: I believe Mr. Kaltenborn has something to add.

Mr. Kaltenborn: I feel that there was a very constructive suggestion in what Mr. Lerner said about foreign control of German corporations. I, myself, tried to work out a plan under which in every important German corporation there would be one American representative, not necessarily the man at the top, but a man in a key position who had complete access to all the information concerning the corporation, and who could, because of his key position, prevent that corporation from turning any of its energies to rearmament. It seems to me that that kind of integration and cooperation would work out better than the attempt to impose a completely alien control on every German corporation.

Mr. Ziemer: Thank you, Mr.

Kaltenborn. Waverly Root has something to add.

Mr. Root: It seems to me that the last question on education really hits at what's most important of all. It isn't essentially important whether Germany is federalized or whether it's unified. It isn't perhaps quite as important whether it is economically a unit or whether its economy is distributed among various states—what is important is that the will to aggression should be killed. Germany might have been unified in 1848. Bismarck blocked it at that time because it would have been unified under liberal supervision. He waited till 1870, when it could be unified under Prussian domination. It is the Prussian psychology which has to be stamped out in Germany. If that can be done, we don't have to be afraid of Germans thereafter. (*Applause.*)

Mr. Lerner: I have something to add to Mr. Kaltenborn's very gallant rallying to my support, for which I am grateful to him, and yet I cannot really accept his version of the idea of an American representative sitting on the German corporations. I assume that, in most cases, Mr. Kaltenborn, that might well mean one of the big American business men interested in that kind of industry, and we have had experience, not so long ago, of the actual collaboration between big American cartel business and big German cartel business

(*applause*)—so much experience that I don't think we ought to venture that kind of combination again.

Mr. Ziemer: I see what you and Mr. Kaltenborn are doing. You are sitting down and just letting somebody else talk, then you make some notes, then you come back at each other—I'll fix that. Mr. Lerner, would you please answer the next one, too?

Man: I'd like to ask Mr. Lerner if he believes that the question of German reparation should be treated leniently, or lightly, or even forgotten in order to aid the quick rehabilitation of the German economic question?

Mr. Lerner: I don't think that you can help Germany to rehabilitate itself economically by reparations. Russia is now demanding reparations. I think from the standpoint of justice, from the standpoint of what the Germans did to the Russians, the Russians ought to have those reparations—and other countries should as well. But if you are looking at it in terms of helping Europe as a whole, including Russia, I think it's more important to get the German economy to producing and to distribute the products of that German economy among the peoples of Europe as well as of Germany. That seems to me more important than reparations. Reparations are punitive, they are not constructive. We are talking now

about a constructive solution. (*Applause.*)

Man: Sir, I would like to ask Mr. Root this: "Assuming that his presentation of the French point of view is correct, what guarantee do we have that the professional French militarists are not pursuing the same policy as after 1918, playing ball with the German militarists against the Weimar Republic?"

Mr. Root: I think you may assume that presentation of the French view is correct because I consulted French authorities before I produced it. The French are much more worried about getting a guarantee that the professional militarists of the Wehrmacht will not pursue the same policy they pursued after 1918. (*Applause.*)

Mr. Ziemer: I see a very young man in the front row in the balcony, please?

Young Man: I'd like to ask Mr. Kaltenborn this: How can you say that Germany, who now at the present time has fascist ideologies, can be allowed to rebuild themselves, without internationalism and eventually become democratic?

Mr. Kaltenborn: Of course, in the first place since the fascist ideologies failed, I think some of their strength has evaporated. In the second place, I don't advocate that Germany rehabilitate herself by herself. I recognize the fact that a period of considerable time

must elapse before occupation can be removed, but what I'm trying to do is to suggest that the unification of Germany, which is our problem tonight, can be better achieved in cooperation with the constructive liberal elements of the German people than with the idea that you can simply impose a military force and produce reform in that way.

Don't forget that Britain and the United States alone are spending \$500,000,000 a year in Germany now to hold her down and provide her with food and necessary materials and to keep our Army of Occupation going. How long do you suppose Britain and the United States will be willing to do that? They want to create a Germany that can support itself and that can also pay for the Army of Occupation. (*Applause.*)

Mr. Lerner: What Mr. Kaltenborn says about the financial drain on Britain and America is very important—particularly on Britain. America is rich and can afford it; Britain is poor and cannot afford that financial drain. Why then are the British doing it? They are doing it because as long as we still think in terms of occupation by the four powers, the British are desperately anxious to have the Ruhr—to have as much of Germany as they can and to keep it from Russia. It is crushing the British economy, and it is impoverishing Britain, and I sug-

gest that this is too big a drain to put on Britain or any other single country. This drain must rest on the world as a whole. The expenses must be borne by the United Nations as a whole and not concentrate on a country like Britain. (*Applause.*)

Mr. Ziemer: Mr. Daniell, you have been taking things a little easy. Is there a question over there for Mr. Daniell?

Man: Mr. Daniell, I'd like to pose this question: Without waiting for fancy pacts and treaties, what immediate means do you suggest for securing the economic revival of activity in Germany without at the same time incurring the risk of dividing Germany into two halves, or a German political entity—again a danger and a threat to world peace?

Mr. Daniell: As I said in my prepared speech, without Russian approval and support, the immediate unification of Germany as planned at Potsdam is impossible. There is no solution except by agreement with Russia. Half of Germany is occupied by Russia, half by France, Britain, and the United States. Until those two slices can be brought together and operated from one central administration over the transport, communications, and commercial activities of the country, there is no chance of unified economic administration.

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Mr. Ziemer: Thank you, Mr. Daniell. I have the vague feeling we have been neglecting the ladies tonight. The lady over there with a question for Mr. Kaltenborn.

Lady: Since economic frustrations cause most modern wars, doesn't European peace depend partly on a like cooperation to re-establish Germany economy and self-supporting peaceful industries there?

Mr. Kaltenborn: Yes, that's a very logical consequence of your first statement, and obviously we are all in favor of that except that we want to be sure that in re-establishing a strong economic Germany, we are not re-establishing a strong military Germany.

Mr. Ziemer: Thank you, Mr. Kaltenborn. Now, we'll have another lady on the right.

Lady: I'd like to ask both Mr. Lerner and Mr. Kaltenborn—

Mr. Ziemer: There you are. You are a brave gal.

Lady: Do you feel that the western foreign ministers have exhausted all possibilities of securing Russian cooperation in a unified Germany before accepting a partial unification which may intensify conflict with Russia?

Mr. Ziemer: Did you get that, Mr. Lerner?

Mr. Lerner: Yes. I never feel that all possibilities have been exhausted until that has been proved. I think the Russians have shown time and again that after some

period of being obdurate and obstinate, they do come around eventually to very much the kind of view that our diplomats and the British diplomats have. I would by no means give up on the idea that Mr. Daniell has that there can be a genuine understanding between the western world and the Russians on this question.

Mr. Kaltenborn: Of course, I would make this answer, that I think the best way—and probably the only way—to assure prompt Russian cooperation on economic unification of Germany as promised at Potsdam, is for the British and the Americans to make a start, and the advantages will be so apparent and the profits will be so real, not only to the economy of Germany but to the economy of Britain and the United States, who will immediately begin to save money, that I rather think that Russia, which is a practical nation, will see the light and will come in.

Mr. Ziemer: Thank you, Mr. Kaltenborn. We're going to overwhelm the girl from Columbus. Here is a third speaker, Mr. Root.

Mr. Root: I think it's pertinent to point out here that the point of view which she just expressed was also expressed by the British Government which decided not to go too rapidly in following Secretary Byrnes' plan for uniting the British and American zones on the theory that a last effort ought to be made to try to get the Russians

in before the United States and Great Britain went ahead on their own.

Mr. Ziemer: Thank you, Mr. Root. Now, as a final surprise package, here is Mr. Daniell. That makes it complete.

Mr. Daniell: I think the one thing we ought to avoid above all else is having the semblance of the formation of a western bloc hostile to the Russian administration. Nothing frightens them, nothing scares them, and nothing makes them more balky than just that sort of thing.

Mr. Ziemer: Thank you, Mr. Daniell. And now we can start all over again. A question over on the right for Mr. Lerner, is it?

Man: Mr. Lerner, do you think Russia will cede her supervisory rights over her zone in Germany to the United Nations which necessarily includes her relinquishing her veto rights?

Mr. Lerner: I have no pipe line as to what Russia will or will not do. (*Laughter.*) I think that what we were talking about was what kind of a plan would work. I think that the Russians have in the long run a rational view of the world in the sense that another war in Europe would not benefit Russia, ravaged as she has been by the war that has just ended, Russia that wants to rebuild its economic strength. I am assuming an ultimate rationalism in Russia.

The question has several times been raised now about the veto power. I don't think that the veto power can possibly operate on the sort of thing that I am discussing, which is an administrative question. Where you are dealing with administrative questions, you are dealing with technical ways and means, and there is no room for the veto power on that.

I think it's quite possible that the Russians might object to throwing the German question into the United Nations where they might be out-voted. That's why I said that I don't think this solution is likely to be adopted. But I think it's necessary for clear thinking on our part to make up our minds on what we think, and then talk in terms of whether other nations will accept.

Mr. Ziemer: Thank you Mr. Lerner. I see a very tall gentleman in the balcony with a question for Mr. Kaltenborn, is it?

Man: Yes. Mr. Kaltenborn, why would it not be a good idea to divide Germany up as it was before 1870 into its component parts and perhaps put high tariff walls between them so that by no means could it come together to unite for the purpose of war?

Mr. Kaltenborn: In the first place, I don't believe in high tariff walls, neither in Germany or anywhere else. (*Applause.*) I think they have done much to provoke war. As a student of the history

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of Germany I know that the curse of Europe was what was called German particularism. That is, there were always a score and more of states that allied themselves with different powers—Russia, France, Austria, Hungary—with the result that they were eternally fighting one another.

Germany, for more than a century, was the cockpit of Europe; and because of that, Bismarck found it comparatively easy to reconcile the Germans to unity. As I said in my talk, I do not believe that you can set back the clock of history. What you advocate is retrogression. It certainly is not German unity, which we're talking about tonight. (*Applause.*)

Mr. Ziemer: Thank you, gentlemen—Mr. H. V. Kaltenborn, Raymond Daniell, Waverly Root, and Max Lerner. I am sorry this has come to an end, and then again I'm not so sorry. Through your discussion this evening you have thrown new light on the complex German problem, and you have enabled us all to see more clearly the fundamental issues involved. That's certainly very important.

Now here is an announcement on next week's program.

Announcer: Next week, America's Town Meeting will originate from Rutgers University in New Brunswick, New Jersey, where we will consider the important domestic question "Is the Veteran Getting a Square Deal in Education?"

The speakers will be Dr. Raymond Walters, president of the University of Cincinnati, Chairman of the Education Relationships Committee of the American Council on Education; Donald Kingsley, director for Manpower and Veteran Affairs, Office of War Mobilization and Reconversion; Dr. Robert B. Stewart, director of the Educational Advisory Committee of the Veterans' Administration and vice-president of Purdue University; and Chat Paterson, legislative representative of the American Veterans Committee.

The guest moderator will be Dr. Houston Peterson, professor of philosophy at Rutgers University.

In case you missed any part of tonight's program, remember you may secure a complete copy in the Town Meeting Bulletin which is published every week for your convenience. Just send ten cents to Town Hall, New York 18, New York. Now, here's our moderator, Mr. Ziemer.

Mr. Ziemer: Our committee of judges has awarded the \$25 United States Savings Bond to our girl from Columbus, Ohio, Martha Saenger, for bringing all of our four speakers to their feet with the question "Do you feel that the western foreign ministers have exhausted all possibilities for a unified Germany before accepting partial unification which will divide Germany?" Congratulations, Miss Saenger. (*Applause.*)